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Abstract   Starting from Michel Foucault’s considerations dedicated to economic 
knowledge (especially in Il faut défendre la société and Naissance de la biopolitique), 
this paper is about setting up a possible theoretical framework in which to situate 
the relationship between political power and neoliberalism as they appear in their 
modern articulation, analyzing in depth how international governmental organizations 
– such as, for example, the European Central Bank, the European Union and the 
International Monetary Fund – are involved in this process.
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European Central Bank
As happened in previous cycles of its expansion, when capitalism 
broke out of the container of the nation state in the last third of the 
twentieth century and started to create a single global market, it 
began to destroy not merely the institution of the national market 
but also the framework of laws, conventions and organisations, 
built over two centuries, that had sustained and humanised it.
Prem Shankar Jha, 
The Twilight of the Nation State, p. 96
Taking as a starting point some of Michel Foucault’s remarks concerning 
economic knowledge, this paper aims to outline a possible theoretical frame-
work within which to situate relations between political power and neolib-
eralism, as they manifest themselves in their current articulation. From 
within such paradigm, it will proceed by also problematising the concept of 
national sovereignty, proposing to interpret its dissolution in terms of a 
progressive denationalization, upon whose singular consequences – both 
philosophical and juridical – it will become necessary to dwell with due care. 
The reference I make to Foucault, here, is above all methodological in kind. 
In fact, I regard his research activity in the second half of the 1970s – to be 
precise, from Il faut défendre la société (1976) to Naissance de la biopolitique 
(1978–79) – as having laid the foundations, through fundamental intuitions 
at times only embryonically developed, for the elaboration of an adequate 
access strategy to the problem of the contemporary economy; one that thus 
moves beyond not only liberal thought but also the many interpretations of 
a Marxist inclination, however much penetrating the latter may be. But 
where should we place the start of the ‘contemporary’ in economic terms? 
A date, however much symbolic, seems fit for purpose: that of 6th August 
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1979, when Paul Volcker was appointed as Chairman of the Federal Reserve, 
inaugurating the kind of monetarist policies that, assiduously practiced to 
this day, also seem to represent the incontrovertible constant of the world 
economy in the past thirty years. It will be noted that, nonetheless, the last 
lecture of the aforementioned course on the Birth of Biopolitics is dated 4th 
April 1979. According to the proposed periodisation, the development of 
the contemporary economy therefore appears to be immediately succeeding 
the analyses performed by Foucault: how is it possible, then, to appeal to 
the latter in order to understand the former? I will try to show that the 
Foucauldian discourse, while paradigmatic for the forms of pre-Reaganian 
liberalism, contains numerous insights that we may make use of extending 
to the present day. In this sense his researches, far from being able to be 
doxographically repeated, prove to be incisive to the highest degree when, 
reacting with newly available materials, they undergo those modifications 
that every understanding of the present demands from the instruments it 
has inherited. At any rate, it is far from coincidental that the French thinker, 
committed to the attempt to penetrate the ‘dispositifs’ of current affairs by 
probing into its genealogical antecedents, has touched upon some of the 
founding principles of contemporary economics. What is astonishing instead 
is that – contrary to the numerous studies focused on psychiatric power, 
systems of imprisonment, or the concept of biopolitics, and save for a few 
exceptions that still are predominantly reconstructive in their orientation1 
– there exists no critical extension to the most recent ‘evolutions’ of financial 
capitalism of Foucault’s theses on economics.2
1 Cf. M. Bonnafous-Boucher, Le liberalisme dans la pensee de Michel Foucault: un libe-
ralisme sans liberté, Paris 2001; J.-Y. Grenier, A. Orléan, Michel Foucault, l’économie 
politique et le libéralisme, in „Annales. Histoire, Sciences sociales“, 5, septembre–octobre 
2007, pp. 1155–1182; I. Vigo De Lima, Foucault’s Archaeology of Political Economy, Ba-
singstoke (Hampshire) 2010 and A. Zanini, L’ordine del discorso economico. Linguaggio 
delle ricchezze e pratiche di governo in Michel Foucault, Verona 2010. A completely sepa-
rate discussion should be made on the attempt accomplished in G. Agamben, Il Regno 
e la Gloria. Per una genealogia teologica dell’economia e del governo, Torino 2009 (I ed. 
Venezia 2007), Eng. tr. Lorenzo Chiesa (with Matteo Mandarini), The Kingdom and the 
Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government, Stanford California 
2011; where the relation between oikonomia and governmentality is developed along 
a completely autonomous trajectory – thus neither reconstructive nor historiographical 
– which however much it makes its own the analyses conducted by Foucault in Sécurité, 
territoire, population (cf. Ibid., pp. 273–277), it overcomes them in the direction of 
what in them has remained unexamined. Agamben in fact writes, relatively to his research 
(Ibid., p. xi): „It locates itself in the wake of Michel Foucault’s investigations on the 
genealogy of governmentality, but, at the same time, it also aims to understand the 
internal reasons why they failed to be completed.“
2 That for Foucault the relation with the economy is of a fundamental importance, it 
can be evinced without any reserves from the following passage (which would cer-
tainly deserve a discussion in its own right, which is nonetheless impossible to elaborate 
on here): „The problem that is at issue in the research I am talking about can, I think, 
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Let us enter then into the heart of his argument. In the opening stages of the 
1978–79 course, he presents us with the following reasoning. In the Middle 
Ages, the sovereign had managed to subject to their own dominion every 
other feudal authority, by relying on its monopoly over the administration 
of justice and the military apparatus; thus, the judiciary counted as a kind 
of „multiplier of royal power“ [„multiplicateur du pouvoir royal“].3 Beginning 
from the sixteenth century, but especially from the start of the seventeenth, 
we witness an essential mutation: juridical institutions no longer have the 
function of multiplying, but rather that of limiting the power of the king. In 
the balance of powers, they oppose themselves to the „indefinite extension 
of raison d’État that is becoming embodied in a police state“ [„extension 
indéfinie d’une raison d’État prenant corps dans un État de police“].4 Indeed, 
it extends even further than this: since laws constitute the backbone of the 
State, they precede it; they are its ‘condition of possibility’ and, therefore, they 
institute the very authority of the monarch, who must act within them and 
has no right to undermine them. So then, the reason of state is founded 
upon an external law that both precedes it and limits it. And the same is 
valid for the exercise of government, which is legitimised by a power that is 
other and exterior, and is held by the judiciary. Whenever in fact the sovereign 
be broken down as follows. First: Is power always secondary to the economy? Are its 
finality and function always determined by the economy? Is it designed to establish, 
solidify, perpetuate, and reproduce relations that are characteristic of the economy and 
essential to its workings? Second question: Is power modelled on the commodity? Is 
power something that can be possessed and acquired, that can be surrendered through 
a contract or by force, that can be alienated or recuperated, that circulates and fertil-
izes one region but avoids others. Or if we wish to analyze it, do we have to operate – on 
the contrary – with different instruments, even if power relations are deeply involved 
in and with economic relations, even if power relations and economic relations always 
constitute a sort of network or loop?“ [„Le problème qui fait l’enjeu des recherches dont 
je parle peut, je crois, se décomposer de la manière suivante. Premièrement: le pouvoir 
est-il toujours dans une position seconde par rapport à l’économie? Est-il toujours finalisé 
et comme fonctionnalisé par l’économie? Le pouvoir a-t-il essentiellement pour raison d’être 
et pour fin de servir l’économie? Est-il destiné à la faire marcher, à solidifier, à maintenir, 
à reconduire des rapports qui sont caractéristiques de cette économie et essentiels à son 
fonctionnement? Deuxième question: le pouvoir est-il modelé sur la marchandise? Le pouvoir 
est-il quelque chose qui se possède, qui s’acquiert, qui se cède par contrat ou par force, qui 
s’aliène ou se récupère, qui circule, qui irrigue telle région, qui évite telle autre? Ou bien, 
faut-il, au contraire, pour l’analyser, essayer de mettre en œvre des instruments différents, 
même si les rapports de pouvoir sont profondément intriqués dans et avec les relations 
économiques, même si effectivement les rapports de pouvoir constituent toujours une sorte 
de faisceau ou de boucle avec les relations économiques?“] (M. Foucault, Il faut défendre 
la société, Paris 1997, Eng. tr. David Macey, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the 
Collège de France, 1975–76, London 2004, p. 14). 
3 M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France 1978–1979, 
Paris 2004, p. 9, Eng. tr. Arnold Davidson, Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de 
France (1978–1979), Palgrave MacMillan 2008, p. 8.
4 Ibid., Eng. tr. ibid.
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violates the limit imposed by legislation, he can be declared illegitimate, and 
as a consequence his command over each of his subjects to obey is weakened.
At the height of the eighteenth century, Foucault recognises however the 
presence of a break of utmost importance, given by the need of „establishing 
a principle of limitation that will no longer be extrinsic to the art of govern-
ment, as was law in the seventeenth century, [but] intrinsic to it“.5 But in what 
does it consist – „[w]hat can an internal limitation of governmental ratio-
nality be?“ [„qu’est-ce que peut être une limitation interne de la rationalité 
gouvernementale?“].6 Now the need to keep the sovereign’s actions under 
control is no longer felt, and it is instead the activity of the executive that must 
be circumscribed. Or rather, it is the very government that must ‘self-limit’ 
itself, on the basis of a rational function that would allow it to achieve maximum 
results – in terms of increase in prosperity – by reducing its own operation to 
the minimum. Well, such rational function – or, as Foucault calls it, „intel-
lectual instrument“ [„instrument intellectuel“]7 – is the political economy.8 It 
is thus the characteristic of a State that has within itself the principle of its 
own sovereignty, which indeed does not derive from any external foundation 
or legitimation; but which, ever since seventeenth century despotism, consists 
in fact in „an economic government which is not hemmed in and whose 
boundaries are not drawn by anything but an economy which it has itself 
defined and which it completely controls“ [„un gouvernement économique, 
mais qui n’est enserré, qui n’est dessiné dans ses frontières par rien d’autre qu’une 
économie qu’il a lui-même définie et qu’il contrôle lui-même totalement“].9 
Therefore, we can deduce that at least at an early stage, the political economy, 
as the principle of the State’s constitution, is posed by the very same State of 
which precisely it is the primary foundation. This is the truly vicious circle of 
power, understood essentially as the government’s self-legitimation.
Justified by Foucault,10 I now allow myself to jump to the heart of the twentieth 
century. Germany, 1948: while Europe as a whole – with the exception, at 
5 „Cette transformation, elle consiste en quoi? Eh bien, d’un mot, elle consiste dans la 
mise en place d’un principe de limitation de l’art de gouverner qui lui ne soit plus extrinsèque 
comme l’était le droit au XVIIe siècle, [mais] qui va lui être intrinsèque“ (ibid., p. 12, 
Eng. tr. Ibid., p. 10).
6 Ibid., Eng. tr. ibid.
7 Ibid, p. 15, Eng. tr. Ibid., p. 13.
8 Cf. Ibid., Eng. tr. Ibid.: „Well, once again, the intellectual instrument, the type of 
calculation or form of rationality that made possible the self-limitation of governmental 
reason was not the law. What is it, starting nom the middle of the eighteenth century? 
Obviously, it is political economy.“ [„Eh bien, cet instrument intellectuel, le type de 
calcul, la forme de rationalité qui permet ainsi à la raison gouvernementale de s’autolimiter, 
encore une fois ce n’est pas le droit. Qu’est-ce que ça va être à partir du milieu du XVIIIe 
siècle? Eh bien, évidemment, l’économie politique.“]
9 Ibid., pp. 16–17, Eng. tr. Ibid., p. 14.
10 „So I will skip two centuries, because obviously I do not claim to be able to under-
take the overall, general, and continuous history of liberalism from the eighteenth to 
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any rate partial, of Belgium and Italy11 –is governed by political economies 
that are Keynesian in kind, Ludwig Erhard, then in charge of the economic 
administration of the Anglo-American area and future chancellor, delivers 
a speech where the following affirmation appears: „Wenn auch nicht im Ziele 
vollig einig, so ist doch die Richtung klar, die wir einzuschlagen haben – die 
Befreiung von der staatlichen Befehlswirtschaft.“12 That is, he advocated „to 
free the economy from State control“ – to return to that laissez-faire that 
Keynes, in that notorious 1926 article,13 had too precociously decreed at an 
end. But what does this all mean, within which – with Foucault – we have 
to recognise the most important outcome of the long parabola of liberalism 
before 1979? Let us just imagine what Germany was like during those years. 
In full reconstruction, occupied by the Allies and politically annihilated 
after the regime’s dramatic capitulation, the German nation has no legitimate 
foundation on which it can constitute the new ‘democratic’ State. It is not 
possible to refer to any preceding institution, since Nazism has severed any 
historical continuity with the past; and „[i]t is not possible to claim juridical 
legitimacy inasmuch as no apparatus, no consensus, and no collective will 
can manifest itself in a situation in which Germany is on the one hand di-
vided, and on the other occupied“.14 What will the constitutive criterion be, 
then, demanded to give legitimacy to the new State; that criterion which 
Foucault – with a subtlety and capacity of penetration difficult to equal – 
glimpses in Erhard’s abovementioned externalisation? The German State 
will have to found itself upon the principles of its own economic model: it will 
be the very institution of the new economic freedom that will legitimate the 
formation of the nascent sovereign political entity. To put it in the author’s 
unequivocal words: „in contemporary Germany, the economy, economic 
development and economic growth, produces sovereignty; it produces po-
litical sovereignty through the institution and institutional game that, pre-
cisely, makes this economy work. The economy produces legitimacy for the 
state that is its guarantor. In other words, the economy creates public law“ 
the twentieth century“ [„Je vais donc faire un saut de deux siècles, car je n’ai pas la 
prétention de vous faire bien sûr l’histoire globale, générale et continue du libéralisme 
du XVIIIe au XXe siècle“]. Ibid., p. 80, Eng. tr. Ibid., p. 78).
11 I refer to an acute observation Foucault makes, cf. Ibid., p. 83, Eng. tr. Ibid., p. 81.
12 L. Erhard, Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnten. Reden und Schriften, Dusseldorf 1988, 
p. 110, cit. in M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France 
1978–1979, cit., p. 82, Eng. tr. Arnold Davidson, Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège 
de France (1978–1979), Palgrave MacMillan 2008, pp. 80–81.
13 Cf. J. M. Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire, in The Collected Writings of John Maynard 
Keynes (29 voll.), London 1971. IX. Essays in Persuasion, pp. 272–294.
14 „Il n’est pas possible de revendiquer une légitimité juridique dans la mesure où il 
n’y a pas d’appareil, il n’y a pas de consensus, il n’y a pas de volonté collective qui puisse 
se manifester dans une situation où l’Allemagne, d’une part, est partagée et, d’autre 
part, occupée.“ (M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France 
1978–1979, cit., p. 84, Eng. tr. Arnold Davidson, Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège 
de France (1978–1979), Palgrave MacMillan 2008, p. 82).
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[„dans l’Allemagne contemporaine, l’économie, le développement économique, 
la croissance économique produit de la souveraineté, produit de la souver-
aineté politique par l’institution et le jeu institutionnel qui fait précisément 
fonctionner cette économie. L’économie produit de la légitimité pour l’Ètat qui 
en est le garant. Autrement dit, [...] l’économie est créatrice de droit public“].15 
The importance of this thesis is rather difficult to assess. In my view, it 
identifies what we may perhaps indicate as a veritable principium individu-
ationis of the liberal State from 1945 to 1979. But after that? What changes 
after that date? And in what way do the analyses conducted by Foucault 
prove themselves useful to understand the transformations that follow it? 
Before turning to a discussion of my hypotheses on the matter, let us first 
summarise in three points – three theses on the foundation of sovereignty – 
what has been gained by reading Foucault:
(1)  The modern State (seventeenth century) is founded upon an external 
law, which legitimates and at the same time limits the exercise of 
sovereignty.
(2)  The liberal State (eighteenth century) is founded upon an internal 
function of its own: the political economy, which it has instituted 
itself and through which it self-limits its own governmental action.
(3)  The ‘post-Keynesian’ State (1945–1979) is a product of the free 
market economy. Insofar as it „creates public law“, it is that very 
same economic freedom which institutes the sovereignty of the State.
Some observations are in order regarding this. Indicating the variable 
economy with the letter ε, and having to recognise the modality in which it 
is present in each of the three theses just enunciated, and thus its respective 
degree of incidence, in (1), (2) and (3), I would indicate it in the following way:
(1):  ε0 In the first thesis, the economy does not appear. The modern 
State (seventeenth century) is founded upon an external law, and 
at this level the economic variable does not play any role.
(2):  ε1 In the second thesis, the economy is a function internal to the 
liberal State (eighteenth century), legitimates its power but still 
remains a ‘theoretical instance’, an „intellectual instrument“ pro-
duced by the State.
(3):  ε2 In the third thesis, it is the economy that institutes the ‘post-
Keynesian’ State (1945–1979), which thus is totally subordinate 
to it.
The three theses manifest therefore a patent progression, according to which 
the economy acquires ever more importance with respect to the State. In fact, 
if the economy at first does not even appear (ε0), it then enters the scene in 
15 Ibid., pp. 85–86, Eng. tr. Ibid., p. 84.
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the guise of a function that is inherent and subordinate to the State (ε1), 
proposing itself in the end as that which even ‘produces’ it (ε2). In parallel, 
we also witness some significant variations in the power expressed by the 
State, σ:
(1):  σ1 The instance of the modern State (seventeenth century) is sub-
ordinated to an external law.
(2):  σ2 The liberal State (eighteenth century) is essentially autarchic: it 
derives from itself, by instituting it within itself, the principle of its 
own legitimacy.
(3):  σ1 The ‘post-Keynesian’ State (1945–1979) is a product of its own 
economic model and thus becomes subordinate to it.
By observing (2) and (3) in relation to the behaviour of ε as much as that 
of σ, we can evince the following consideration: they are ‘inversely propor-
tional’ instances. The closer we get to the contemporary the more a ten-
dency makes itself clear: to the growth of the economy’s influence corresponds 
a reduction in the State’s political weight. So then, the attempt to think the 
contemporary in light of the frame obtained from Foucault will not at all 
mean to take up again one of his three theses, in order to ‘recycle’ it and 
apply it ‘as it is’ to the present-day financial dispositif. None of this. To think 
the contemporary in light of the itinerary traced in Birth of Biopolitics will 
mean instead to carry on such way autonomously with a view to formulate 
one’s own thesis relatively to the subsequent stage, the one dominated by 
monetarist economics: (4) The neoliberal State (1979–2011). Expressed with 
the variables deployed up to here, my hypothesis is the following:
(4): ε3, σ0
Before illustrating its meaning and sketching an attempt of its articulation, 
some considerations are however necessary.
In a recent work, André Orléan summarises with fairly good precision what 
is perhaps the most striking – as well as unexamined – contradiction of the 
current economic order: the one between the State and financial capitalism. 
I will refer then directly to his words: „Market liquidity, insofar as it allows 
capital to be rapidly invested wherever profitable opportunities for present 
themselves, is perceived as eminently positive, and must absolutely be pur-
sued. On the contrary, to obstruct the free movement of capital is regarded 
as the source of a rigidity that diminishes general prosperity. For this reason, 
the theoretical approach we are describing moves towards the suppression 
of all those barriers erected following the great crisis of the Thirties; a sup-
pression which should lead to the advent on a world scale of a market of 
unified capital for all financial products (shares, bonds, derivatives, curren-
cies), all durations (short, medium and long term) and all actors (enter-
prises, families, States). This is the ultimate aim pursued with constancy for 
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the past thirty years by all the ruling classes, both on the left and the right: to 
create financial liquidity on a world scale.“16 Well then, with respect to the 
creation of such „liquidity“ belonging to the economic movement as such 
– a liquidity which, in a Spinozian way, is the physical state of the new ‘substance’ 
(the fluid aggregate of „products“, „durations“ and „actors“) – the borders 
of the State and the resistance of its sovereignty immediately transform 
themselves into dams slowing down or impeding the flow. As Shankar Jha 
notes, taking up the study conducted by Lash and Urry17 (which still remains 
perhaps the most exhaustive on the matter): „The assault on the nation state 
has begun in the realm of the economy. By creating a market and a manu-
facturing network that transcends the national market, globalisation is 
eroding the economic foundations of the nation state.“18 Until here nothing 
new – it is a matter of processes, in all truth, that are anything but under-
ground. Which should drive us instead to revise the traditional categories 
of our political thought – the keystone of which still continues to implicitly 
be the State. And yet, precisely insofar as it is a matter of transformations 
that are for the large part evident, perhaps it is precisely for this reason that 
their authentically revolutionary coefficient escapes us, hiding inside that 
evidence. I resort once more to referring to Foucault, who justified his rejec-
tion of any theory of the State that presupposes it as a given by arguing: „the 
state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an 
autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the 
profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual statification (étatisation) or statifi-
cations (étatisations), in the sense of incessant transactions […] it has no 
interior. The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple 
governmentalities“ [„l’État n’a pas d’essence. L’État ce n’est pas un universel, 
l’État ce n’est pas en lui-même une source autonome de pouvoir. L’État, ce n’est 
rien d’autre que l’effet, le profil, la découpe mobile d’une perpétuelle étatisation, 
ou de perpétuelles étatisations, de transactions incessantes [...] il n’a pas 
d’intérieur. L’État, ce n’est rien d’autre que l’effet mobile d’un régime de gou-
vernementalités multiples“].19 Confronting these observations, what imme-
diately catches the eye here, as well as in the previous reflections advancing 
from Birth of Biopolitics, is that we never come across a ‘description’ of the 
16 A. Orléan, De l’euphorie à la panique. Penser la crise financiére, Paris 2009, tr. it. 
Dall’euforia al panico. Pensare la crisi finanziaria e altri saggi, a cura di A. Fumagalli e 
S. Lucarelli, Verona 2010, pp. 58–59. My trans. The concept of ‘financial’ liquidity – and 
for this reason virtual and dehumanised – expressed by Orléan, seems to me more poignant 
than the one, more notorious, thematised in Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge 
2000, which in my view suffers the influence of a still essentially humanist approach.
17 S. Lash, J. Urry, The End of Organised Capitalism, Cambridge 1987.
18 P. Shankar Jha, The Twilight of the Nation State. Globalisation, Chaos and War, 
London 2006, p. 97.
19 M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France 1978–1979, 
cit., p. 79, Eng. tr. Arnold Davidson, Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 
(1978–1979), Palgrave MacMillan 2008, p. 77.
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State but always the highlighting of its own forming, of the process of its 
own constituting, without which the State would remain nothing. This is so 
because the State – in the same way as politics, the economy or any other 
‘disembodied institution’ of the historical being-there20 – is not in itself 
something existing; in spite of this, it can become ‘something’ as soon as it 
becomes indispensable for a practice so as to produce itself. This practice 
alone makes it exist, according to a peculiar modality of presence that may 
be assimilated perhaps to commingling; that is, the commingling of a real 
event with the intangible instance that it expects in order that it may con-
cretely assert itself. But then, what is it that Foucault achieves in making us 
understand? Precisely that the State does not exist: that, as such, neither it 
existed before nor it exists now. All that has undoubtedly existed, instead, 
and to which the theses previously listed ((1), (2) and (3)) alluded to, is 
not so much the State but rather three different processes of statification; 
which, strictly speaking, have had as their ‘outcome’ the formation of three 
distinct entities, certainly comparable, but which we could also name by 
recurring to different terminology. If prior to 1979, therefore, those practices 
effectively put in place translated themselves into configuring the ‘State’, 
today inverse processes (or even more simply different ones) could concre-
tise themselves in its ‘dismantling’; which is exactly what coincides with the 
thesis that is here sustained and ‘gathered’ under the concept of denation-
alization. As the above recalled observations by Orléan and Shankar Jha 
illustrate, the current economic model demands the progressive denationalization 
of political power: the attainment of a state of absolute liquidity capable to 
optimise the performance of financial capital – the current form of the ‘eco-
nomic’ – thus entails the dissolution of any national sovereignty whatsoever. 
In continuity with the trend lines already found in (1), (2) and (3), the 
formula previously identified21 will therefore mean:
20 Cfr. Ibid., p. 22, Eng. tr. Ibid., p. 21.
21 A brief remark – in the form of a mare critical hint – on the term ε. The exponent 
which accompanies the variable ε may be thus interpreted: while in the presence of the 
classical liberal State – that which Marx speaks about, let’s say – the dimensions of the 
economy are still two (production and exchange) – from which the expression ε2 derives, 
indicating a horizontal kind of economic model – , in the epoch of the dissolution of the 
State the economy develops instead a third dimension, relatively to finance. From this 
derives the expression ε3, so as to indicate precisely this ‘verticalization’ of the economic, 
which, abstracting itself both from production and from exchange (which are nonetheless 
maintained), it also operates within a dimension that is other, and reveals aspects of 
virtuality. In brief: the economy becomes volumetric (which does not exclude that in the 
future further dimensions may be developed: εn→∞?) Clearly, though, finance was already 
present much before 1979 (it is sufficient to think of the investigations carried out in 
the first half of the twentieth century by R. Hilferding, Das Finanzkapital. Eine Studie 
über die jüngste Entwicklung des Kapitalismus, Wien 1910). How can we then avoid such 
observation? It should be explained that, for instance, the analyses here presented, as 
much as Foucault’s own, identify tendencies and do not describe ‘facts’. When, for example, 
it is said that the liberal State of the eighteenth century is founded upon the political 
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(4):  ε3, σ0 The neoliberal State (1979–2011) is progressively annihi-
lated by the real movement of the economy. Such economy, which 
had already subordinated to itself – by making use of it – the ‘post-
Keynesian’ State (1945–1979), conceiving it as a product of its own 
‘performance’, now no longer needs the State. In order to fully as-
sert itself it requires, rather, the ability of suppressing those ties 
imposed by the existence of statal sovereignty and its laws. The 
formula ε3, σ0 therefore reduces itself to a very simple assertion: 
the economy without the State.
The context in which the research here proposed aims to operate has thus 
been delineated: to think the economy – and the whole of what it articulates 
politically – in a regime of ‘zero sovereignty’: to think the liquidity of the eco-
nomic environment in the epoch of neoliberalism. The point we have reached, 
however, can only be a consistent starting point in the general framework 
of the problem and in elucidating its provenance, its complex stratification 
of the historical forms upon which it rests, and which also allows its ‘consist-
ing’, its crystallising in an emersion, however much temporary but still 
nonetheless long-lasting with respect to the biological time of the experience 
perceiving it. I will thus conclude this brief presentation by comparing the 
hypothesis that has been formulated ((4)) with the three theses in which 
economy as its own internal function, do I intend to say perhaps that the State is no 
longer legitimated by any law whatsoever that limits its power? If that were the case, 
we could bring forward as ‘evidence’ a whole series of strictly historiographical events 
and analyses, which in appearance would subvert the thesis advanced in Birth of Bio-
politics. Nonetheless, it is not a matter here of having recourse to a positivistic vision of 
history – which pretends to be based on ascertaining ‘facts’ as if they were incontrovert-
ible – so as to destitute every attempt to obtain dominant implexes in the political ar-
ticulation of power and of its development. The question that ought to be posed is not 
so much what factually exists – or has ‘existed’ – and what has not, but rather: what is, 
in a given period, the dominant function which power makes use of (or has made use 
of) in order to govern real processes – as pose itself as real? In these terms, it should be 
said then that while in the regime ε2, σ1 the axis of power relies on the relation between 
the horizontal economy (production, exchange) and the State (where the latter, however 
much subordinated to the former, remains nonetheless fundamental for the interests of 
power), in the epoch of contemporary neoliberalism the above mentioned formula ε3, 
σ 0 seems prevalent, entailing the imposition of a three-dimensional economy (produc-
tion, exchange, finance) which is essentially destatifying – which, in its turn, does not 
mean that materially there are no longer nations, but that what about these is truly 
significant does not consist so much in the fact that they, out of a kind of ‘hereditary 
bureaucratic automatism’, continue to perform the tasks classically attributed to the 
State, but in the process of disintegration to which they are subjected. Put more explic-
itly, σ0 does not indicate a ‘factual’ annihilation of the State, but the fact that today the 
State is a function of economic power insofar as it is subject to denationalization. That 
which, of the State, sets off real processes, derives from its own dissolution, and not 
from the ‘insistence’ with which – in a totally fictitious way – it continues to exercise its 
hereditary prerogatives.
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the Foucauldian reflection on the State has been summarised. Beginning 
from such comparison, the actual problematic articulations that the paper 
proposes to confront will thus be made more evidently clear.
In a preliminary way, I would like to sketch a brief reflection. The accent 
has been placed on the fact that statal sovereignty, overwhelmed by the 
contradiction with the supranational character of the financialised economy, 
finds itself gradually forced out from the exercise of government. But how 
does this exclusion happen concretely? Its modalities are multiple and com-
plex. Herein I will limit myself to indicate one way, which is particularly 
relevant since it is inherently political, and which concerns the handing over 
– juridically regulated – of a part of its national sovereignty to any political 
subject or organisation whatsoever, such the European Union or the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. Let us consider, for instance, specifically the latter 
example, the IMF: its economic role in the management and in conditioning 
the market is evident, and thus it does not necessitate to be argued for. What 
matters is the fact that its power is located outside of representational 
mechanisms. Even it is true that members of the IMF still are elected by the 
single governments of the member states, this does not take away from the 
fact that the government of a nation is not necessarily, in its turn, composed 
by elected members; and that, equally, the absence of a direct election con-
stitutes a very serious problem with regard to the political legitimacy of 
activities carried out by the IMF. In whichever state it is – it is impossible 
here to linger on the details of such question – , we find ourselves before an 
extraordinary significant circumstance: an international organism that is 
endowed with enormous power, acting without any direct political control 
on the part of the populations upon which it is legitimised to intervene. Put 
otherwise: a significant portion of sovereignty, handed over to an interna-
tional organism that exercises economic power, is subtracted from the State’s 
political intervention. State power is thus forcefully limited: there exists a 
law external to the State that, exercised by a subject that is other, circum-
scribes its power. In the case of the IMF, such law concerns precisely the 
economy, upon which each single State cannot completely call itself sover-
eign. But let us return for a moment to the first of the Foucauldian theses 
we had identified. It went like this: (1) The modern State (seventeenth 
century) is founded upon an external law, which legitimates and at the same 
time limits the exercise of sovereignty. With respect to the neoliberal State 
– but to a lesser extent this is valid also for the ‘post-Keynesian’ one – we 
have just said that there exists a law external to the State which, exercised 
by a supranational organism such as the IMF, limits State power. The analogy 
between the two statements is evident: both, precisely, refer to an external 
law that limits State power. There is also, however, a substantial difference: 
whilst in the case of the modern State (seventeenth century) the external 
power was conceived as founding, even antecedent with regard to the State, 
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now in this case we witness something different but perhaps not less sig-
nificant: the ‘external’ law, the law exercised by the IMF as a supranational 
organism, is produced by a specific economic need; that of subtracting from 
statal political power the possibility of exercising its own governmental activity 
over the free market. Reformulating the above cited Foucauldian thesis, ac-
cording to which „the economy creates public law“, we will say that, in light 
of the case just analysed, the following argument could be substantiated: 
the economy creates international law, where precisely such ‘creation’ is an 
eminent form of denationalization. Among the tasks that the present paper 
aims towards, the following should be included: to study the process of 
denationalization in relation to the creation of international law triggered 
by economic power so as to reduce the State’s power of control: how does 
all of this actually happen? Which economic subjects are capable of promot-
ing similar operations? What is their juridical status? And if it were to concern 
private subjects – what sorts of political problems would need to be posed, 
were such situation to take place? Is it possible to come across a trace of this 
in all the documents that are produced, for instance, by an organization 
such as the IMF and by its diplomatic relations with States and institutions? 
We should therefore push ourselves even further. There exist in fact private 
subjects (holding, investment banking, multinational corporations) whose 
actions, intensely destatifying, are dedicated to creating so-called private 
international law, an appellative whose legitimacy is nonetheless theoreti-
cally resisted in multiple ways. Beyond the discussion on this definition’s 
validity or lack thereof – which should at any rate at least be put under ex-
amination – , in my view it poses an unassailable problem: the economy 
creates a peculiar form of law, private international law, which affirms itself 
hand in hand with denationalization, and which in fact has as its primary aim 
that of weakening both governmental action and the State’s legislative action. 
Such law interacts with public international law and heavily conditions it. 
Furthermore, it expresses itself in a whole series of collateral fields with 
respect to the law’s formal sphere; which, equally, would need to be probed 
into (we refer, for example, to the economic interactions on an interna-
tional scale between different private subjects and to the level of material 
relations that they imply).
Let us now reconsider also the following assertion – which corresponds 
latu sensu to the second ((2)) of the theses above listed: „I think that fun-
damentally it was political economy that made it possible to ensure the 
self-limitation of governmental reason“ [„L’économie politique, je crois que 
c’est fondamentalement ce qui a permis d’assurer l’autolimitation de la raison 
gouvernementale“].22 Nevertheless, as for the epoch of neoliberalism, if the 
22 M. Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France 1978–1979, 
cit., p. 15, Eng. tr. Arnold Davidson, Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 
(1978–1979), Palgrave MacMillan 2008, p. 13.
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horizon taking shape ((4)) is that of the absolute absence of statal govern-
ment, what role does the political economy take on when there is no na-
tional sovereignty ‘to limit’ any longer? And once the State is extinct – as it 
is happening to this day – does it still make sense to speak of a political 
economy? Should we not, rather, invert the expression, and thus speak of 
the economic politics of international organisms and supranational subjects 
that exercise actual power without any restraint on the part of statal authori-
ties? In what is the political economy transforming itself in order to survive 
the State’s financial suppression? Does it perhaps take on the appearance 
of a juridical economy, which disciplines the relations between those inter-
national organisms that are in charge of regulating the market, and the 
subjects that hold the highest concentrations of capital? And what role will 
the military apparatus assume in the epoch of the State’s economic overcom-
ing – in what is it destined to transform itself? Only one thing is certain: the 
economy, which was born in order to limit State power ((2)), now perceives 
State power as its own limit. An essential inversion has taken place, which 
has at its summit the economic destitution of the State so as to free the market 
once and for all. The fourth of the theses presented, the one concerning 
contemporary neoliberalism, is therefore the exact overturning of the third 
Foucauldian thesis. Therefore, it is no longer as such:
(3)  It is economic freedom itself that institutes the sovereignty of the 
State,
but rather:
(4)  It is economic freedom itself which destitutes the sovereignty of the 
State.
Before concluding the present reflection, a few more remarks on the prob-
lematic at hand. The first concerns the constitutional synthesis incarnated 
by the State. That there exists an irreconcilable conflict between some of 
the constitutionally sanctioned principles and the development of the mar-
ket, it is plain for all to see. It would in fact be legitimate to postulate – but 
this is something that should be demonstrated more in depth – that eco-
nomic power works actively towards the suppression of the State even with the 
aim of freeing the market from those obligations the Constitution requires. But 
there is a problem that is perhaps more significant, for it concerns the cur-
rent situation: the contradiction which starts to takes shape when, during 
the progressive dissolution of the State, it still conserves some of its princi-
pal prerogatives, such as the expenses for maintaining national public health 
services, for social security, or to promote public works. The circumstance 
in which modern Western nations now find all these costs to be almost 
unsustainable, has perhaps something to do with the fact that, in order to 
be managed, they would require the State to have complete control of its 
own resources. Except that it is precisely this that has become impossible, 
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since the economy has forced the State to hand over its sovereignty, and to 
be made to survive through implementing perpetual extraordinary measures. 
But the repercussions for domestic policies are enormous: harsh austerity, 
increases in income tax, contractions in consumption, the definitive abolition 
of what was left of the welfare State – I propose to interpret these factors of 
instability as consequences of economic power forcing the State to hand over 
its sovereignty; a transfer in which the State is no longer able to plan its own 
economic functioning as a whole. The social collapse of the civil society 
that occurs in these cases should thus be understood as an internal effect 
of the process of denationalization to which sovereign power is submitted 
– something analogous to what has been happening in Greece.
André Orléan writes: „the survival of the financial system has only been as-
sured by the massive intervention of public authorities; an intervention made 
possible precisely because these authorities have ends that are not of a financial 
order.“23 And what is then the „order“ of these ends? They are nothing but 
the attempt to realise an action, a political practice capable of justifying – 
and in a certain sense producing – the existence of the State required in 
order for such order to emerge. More or less the same took place at the time 
of the New Deal, when the unemployed were demanded to dig some holes 
so as to immediately refill them up again, in such a way that they would 
count as really being employed even when they were performing an illusory 
job, contributing to maintaining the production but through a totally un-
productive activity. And yet such similitude has its merits: it is fitting, perhaps, 
insofar as it unmasks the false consciousness of the State in dissolution and 
the absurdity of those stratagems that its advocates contrive in order not to 
accept seeing it die. If there may be some good in reasoning on neoliberal 
policies, this may perhaps be in realising that there is nothing much there 
to salvage, in that disheartening factory of conservation. There is nothing 
more deleterious than lamenting the old nation-state precisely now that its 
parabola is coming to an end; or than for critique pleading, in the intent to 
transform itself into a strategy, for a ‘surrogate’ of the State. Better the shoreless 
sea of liquid transactions, with its vortices and desert islands. It will be out 
of the metastasis of capital that new forms will be born.
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Marčelo Barison
Denacionalizacija 
Neoliberalizam nakon Fukoa
Apstrakt
Po la ze ći of raz ma tra nja Mi še la Fu koa po sve će nim eko nom skom zna nju (po seb no 
u Il fa ut défen dre la so ciété and Na is san ce de la bi o po li ti que), ovaj tekst na sto ji da 
us po sta vi mo gu ći te o rij ski okvir u ko jem se sme šta ju od no si iz me đu po li tič ke 
mo ći i neo li be ra li zma ka kvi se po ja vlju ju u nji ho vim sa vre me nim ar ti ku la ci ja ma, 
kao i du bin sku ana li zu na či na na ko ji su me đu na rod ne or ga ni za ci je vla da vi ne – 
kao što su, na pri mer, Evrop ska cen tral na ban ka, Evrop ska uni ja i Me đu na rod ni 
mo ne tar ni fond – uklju če ne u ovaj pro ces.
Ključ ne re či: Neo li be ra li zam, de na ci o na li za ci ja, Fu ko, me đu na rod ne or ga ni za ci je, 
Evrop ska cen tral na ban ka
